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This paper studies competition for shelf space in a multi-supplier retail point. We consider a retailer that
seeks to allocate her shelf space to maximize her pro¯t. Because products associated with larger pro¯t
margin are granted more shelf space, suppliers can o®er the retailer ¯nancial incentives to obtain larger space
allocations. We analyze the competitive dynamics arising from the scarcity of space, and show existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. We then demonstrate that the ine±ciencies from decentralizing decision-making
are limited to 6% with wholesale-price contracts, and that full coordination can be achieved with pay-to-stay
fee contracts. We ¯nally investigate how competition is distorted under the practice of category management.
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1. Introduction
Product proliferation has not only increased the complexity of manufacturing and distribution, it
has also created new incentive issues in shelf space allocation. To cope with ¯ercer competition,
manufacturers provide retailers with ¯nancial incentives to secure shelf space for their products.
Consumer good manufacturers have indeed been reported to spend 15% of their revenue to pay
stores to stock their products, totaling $100 billion per year in the United States (Forster 2002). The
practice of these transfer payments remains nevertheless obscure, and its competitive nature and
value to the end-consumer are highly debated. For instance, Hewlett-Packard Co. has recently been
criticized for o®ering chain stores incentives to stop selling store-brand inkjet printer cartridges, in
order to increase HP's cartridge's market share by reducing consumer choice (Hamm 2007). The
Federal Trade Commission is in fact investigating whether paying for shelf space is anticompetitive,
after small companies complained they were shut out of stores (FTC Report 2001).
In this paper, we analyze the shelf space allocation problem to understand how much pressure
suppliers face to obtain shelf space. We de¯ne shelf space in a generic sense, including, among
others, shelf space in a grocery store, parking spots at a car dealer, screens in a movie theater, and
advertising space on a website. We assume that suppliers can obtain more shelf space from the
retailer by conceding her larger pro¯t margins, i.e., by lowering their wholesale prices. We model
1Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
2 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
the capacity allocation as a game, demonstrate existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium,
and study its sensitivity to parameter changes. We also show that the ine±ciencies created by the
allocation mechanism are no greater than 6%, if the retail pricing decisions are exogenous, but can
be up to 27% (speci¯cally, 1¡2=e) otherwise. Finally, we discuss how the competitive outcome is
a®ected under the following retailing practices: pay-to-stay fees, manufacturer's o®ering of an entire
product category, introduction of store-brand products, and category management. Our simple
model sheds light onto the potential bene¯ts and pitfalls of various competitive strategies.
We assume that the number of products in the assortment is given, and we model the space
allocated to each Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) as a continuous variable. For a review of assortment
and shelf space models, see KÄ ok et al. (2006). A key assumption of our model, ¯rst postulated by
Lee (1961) and experimentally validated by Curhan (1973) and Dreze at al. (1994), is that, as shelf
space is increased, unit sales increase at a decreasing rate. Under this assumption, Anderson (1979)
and Corstjens and Doyle (1981, 1983) proposed a model for optimizing shelf space allocation across
product categories, and solved it with geometric programming. Bultez and Naert (1988) developed
a method for optimizing shelf space allocation among products within the same category, using an
attraction model, and reported a 12% pro¯t increase in a Belgian grocery store. If the capacity
units are discrete, the shelf space allocation problem can be modeled as an integer optimization
problem (Armstrong et al. 1982). Because these geometric and integer problems are complex to
solve, especially with assortment decisions (Borin at al. 1995), meta-heuristics have been tailored
to the shelf space allocation problem (e.g., Yang 2001 and Lim et al. 2004). Our demand model
is a simpli¯ed version of the one proposed by Corstjens and Doyle (1981), to keep the analysis
tractable, but maintains the same level of practicality: all parameters can easily be estimated with
experimentation (e.g., Bultez and Naert 1988, Dreze et al. 1994) or cross-sectional methods of data
collection (Corstjens and Doyle 1983, Van Dijk et al. 2004).
Building on this demand model, we focus on the pricing game among suppliers, taken the cus-
tomer prices as ¯xed. With a similar model, Mart¶ ³n-Herr¶ an et al. (2006) characterized the wholesale
prices and shelf spaces in equilibrium with two competing suppliers. We complement their results
by analyzing a case with an arbitrary number of suppliers and quantify the ine±ciencies in the retail
chain. Moreover, we provide proofs of their numerical observations and discuss the implications of
alternative retail practices.
Among these widespread retail practices, we ¯rst consider pay-to-stay fees, which are a \rent"
charged by retailers to suppliers in exchange for retailing space. We show that this mechanism
improves supply chain e±ciency, while reducing the suppliers' pro¯ts, re¯ning a proposal madeMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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by Cairns (1962). Another notable type of slotting fee, which we do not consider in this paper, is
the slotting allowance. Slotting allowances are lump-sum, up-front payment from a manufacturer
to a retailer to have a new SKU carried on the retailer's shelves. Lariviere and Padmanabhan
(1997) interpreted the slotting allowances as a signaling instrument about the potential sales of a
new product. In contrast, pay-to-stay fees are charged for existing products to ensure continued
presence on the shelf, and are therefore used more to cope with increased competition (through
product proliferation, see Sullivan 1997) than to reduce demand uncertainty through signaling.
We then analyze supply chain integration, with a particular emphasis on category management.
Under category management, the retailer delegates the category space allocation decision to one
of the suppliers, typically the main player in category. The practice of category management is
at the very least controversial and raises antitrust concerns (e.g., Steiner 2001, Bush and Gelb
2005). Zenor (1994) and Kurtulu» s and Toktay (2005) compared the performance of a channel with
and without category management, when demand is sensitive to prices but not to shelf space. In
contrast, we assume that demand is sensitive to shelf space, consistently with Lee's observation,
and consider the retail prices as exogenous. Zenor concluded from a case study and simulations
that the bene¯ts of category management can be substantial (as high as 30%) and are larger with
more competition. Kurtulu» s and Toktay analytically showed that category management improves
customers' satisfaction, increases the retailer's pro¯t, leaves the category captain indi®erent, and
decreases the other manufacturers' pro¯t. Basuroy et al. (2001) derived similar results in a multi-
brand, multi-retailer Cournot competitive model. Our model analysis corroborates their results,
by showing that they hold even in the absence of pricing decisions.
Our work also relates to the abundant literature on supply chain coordination through supply
contracts. With simple wholesale-price contracts, inventory decisions are typically not coordinated
across the supply chain, a manifestation of the double-marginalization phenomenon (Spengler
1950). The limited performance of these contracts in the presence of stochastic demand was ¯rst
investigated in two-stage supply chains by Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and Cachon and Lariviere
(2001), then in more complex supply chains (see Cachon 2003 for a review). To improve coordina-
tion in supply chains, various alternative contracts have been proposed: buyback, revenue sharing,
quantity °exibility, sales rebate, and quantity discount contracts (see the reviews by Cachon 2003
and Lariviere 1999). Compared to the large body of research on vertical interactions (through
supply contracts) among supply chain partners, horizontal competition has received only limited
attention. Under stochastic demand, horizontal competition has been studied in single-productMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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distribution networks (e.g., Wang and Gerchak 2001 and Cachon 2003), multiple-product distribu-
tion networks (e.g., Bernstein and Federgruen 2005). Carr and Karmarkar (2005) and KÄ ok (2006)
analyzed assembly networks with a deterministic, price-quantity linear relationship and no capac-
ity constraints, respectively focusing on supply network design and coordination mechanisms with
supply contracts. In contrast to these papers, we explicitly model capacity constraints with multi-
ple products, and show that ine±ciencies arise even when retail prices are exogenous (and demand
is deterministic).
To quantify supply chain e±ciency, we use the Price of Anarchy (PoA), which measures the
worst-case ratio of the pro¯t of the integrated supply chain to the pro¯t of the decentralized supply
chain. The concept of PoA was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), and has
since then been extensively used in transportation networks, network resource allocation games,
network pricing games, and supply chain games (see Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Simchi-Levi 2003,
Perakis and Roels 2007, and the references therein).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In x2, we describe the model. We analyze
the suppliers' game in x3. In particular, after showing existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, we
quantify the ine±ciencies created in the space allocation process and explore alternative modeling
assumptions. We then discuss the impact of pay-to-stay fees and supply chain integration in x4
and conclude in x5. All the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a pro¯t-maximizing retailer who seeks to allocate her shelf space capacity to n products.
We are interested in characterizing the wholesale prices that will be quoted by the suppliers. Lower
wholesale prices lead to larger shelf space but reduce the suppliers' unit pro¯t margins. We model
this situation as a sequential game, in which the suppliers play the role of leaders and the retailer
plays the role of the follower. The timing of the game is the following: ¯rst, the suppliers set
their wholesale prices, simultaneously, and then, the retailer chooses the shelf space allocation. We
assume that all relevant cost and demand information is common knowledge. We solve the game
backwards, by ¯rst solving the retailer's shelf space allocation problem and then analyzing the
suppliers' decisions.
2.1. Demand Model
Let si be the amount of shelf space allocated to product i. Similarly to Corstjens and Doyle (1981),
we assume that the demand for product i is an increasing concave function of the number of
displays of product i. More products on the shelf lead to more demand, but the marginal returns
of displaying a product are decreasing.Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. 5
To highlight the e®ects of competition for shelf space, we assume that the demand for product i
depends only on its shelf space si. We initially ignore the e®ects of marketing tactics such as retailer
pricing and supplier advertising in our basic model, but investigate the impact of retail prices in
x3.4. We also ignore the impact of the precise location on the shelf (e.g., products positioned at
eye level seem to generate larger sales, see Dreze et al. 1994), and only consider the total space
allocated to the product.
We assume, for simplicity, that all products share the same elasticity to shelf space. This assump-
tion is not too restrictive if we consider products within the same category. In addition, most our
results (existence and uniqueness of equilibrium) hold when products have di®erent elasticities. We
also ignore cross-elasticities among products, i.e., the dependency of the sales of product j from
product i shelf space, as they are often referred to as \secondary e®ects" (Dreze et al. 1994).
Under these assumptions, demand for product i can be modeled as aisb
i, where ai >0 is a scale
parameter (depending on the brand of supplier i, its advertising policy, etc.) and b, 0 < b < 1, is
the shelf space elasticity. When b¼0, demand is insensitive to shelf space; in contrast, when b¼1,
sales are directly proportional to space.
2.2. The Retailer's Allocation of Shelf Space
We model the retailer's problem as follows. We assume (without loss of generality) that the retailer
has 1 unit of capacity that she seeks to allocate among n di®erent products to maximize her pro¯ts.
Let si be the amount of shelf space granted to product i. Hence,
n X
i=1
si · 1. For tractability, we
assume that si is a continuous variable.
Because shelf space allocation is a strategic decision (assortments are changed unfrequently
and planograms are usually revised at most every couple of months), we consider a single-period
model. Our model also ignores operational issues, such as day-to-day inventory replenishment. (In
fact, store replenishment decisions are often made by suppliers, e.g., through Vendor-Managed
Inventories, and have therefore limited impact on the retailer's allocation decision.) We ¯nally
neglect constraints on product availability, or required minimum or maximum shelf space allo-
cations (Corstjens and Doyle 1983). While these constraints can easily be incorporated into our
model, they unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
We then assume that the only relevant costs for the retailer are the products' gross pro¯t margin.
For simplicity, we assume linear costs; hence the pro¯t margin for product i can be expressed as
ri ¡wi, where ri is the unit retail selling price, minus the inventory and handling costs, and wi is
the unit wholesale price for product i. Under these assumptions, the retailer seeks to allocate her
shelf space so as to maximize her pro¯ts, that is,Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space













De¯ne, for i=1;:::;n; the gross margin of product i, i.e., the maximum pro¯t that the retailer
can obtain with product i:
mi :=ai(ri ¡wi): (2)













Under this allocation scheme, all products are somewhat complementary. Indeed, given the
limited shelf space, the (continuous) solution for b < 1 is always to provide some space for each
product. Only when b ¼ 1, i.e., when demand is strongly sensitive to the number of displays, will
the retailer allocate the entire shelf space to the product with the highest margin mi.


















2.3. Suppliers' Pricing Strategies
Each product is procured from a distinct vendor. While the retailer maximizes pro¯ts over the
entire product category, suppliers are only concerned about the pro¯t from their own products.
The pricing decision is strategic, because it a®ects the retailer's shelf space allocation. We therefore
ignore short-term inventory considerations (e.g., quantity discounts) in our model, because of their
limited impact on the allocation decision. With linear production costs ci and with a wholesale-price
contract wi, supplier i's gross pro¯t margin equals wi ¡ci.
The suppliers' pricing decisions need to take into account the competitors' prices, because they
in°uence the space allocation. Speci¯cally, since we model the retailer as a follower, each supplier
anticipates the retailer's space allocation given the competitors' wholesale prices. Hence, supplier
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, is decreasing with wi, and increasing
with wj, j 6= i, which is a standard condition for substitute products. It does not, however, have
increasing di®erences, in contrast to most competitive demand models (such as separable demand
functions). The increasing di®erence property means that decreasing the price of any product
results in a greater increase in the demand for that product for lower levels of the price of any other
product (Topkis 1998). It is easy to show that the demand for supplier i has decreasing di®erences
when si · 50% and increasing di®erences otherwise. Hence, with n = 2, when supplier 2 has the
largest shelf space share, the increase in supplier 1's demand resulting from a decrease in w1 is
larger when w2 is higher, and not when w2 is lower, as most models typically assume.
2.4. The Supply Chain Perspective












When suppliers quote (w1;:::;wn), the allocation of space may be suboptimal for the supply
chain. Indeed, the concentration of the shelf-space allocation in the hands of the retailer, coupled
with the competition among suppliers, creates a negative externality, because the resulting space
allocation may not maximize the total pro¯t of the supply chain.
We consider as a benchmark the centralized (or integrated) supply chain, as if there were a single
decision-maker operating the entire supply chain. We denote the maximum supply chain pro¯t
associated with product i by
m
¤
i :=ai(ri ¡ci); (7)








































In the sequel, we measure supply chain e±ciency as the ratio of the integrated supply chain
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In particular, we use the Price of Anarchy (PoA), de¯ned as the maximum (or supremum) ratio of
pro¯ts between the centralized supply chain and the decentralized supply chain, among all possible
problem instances, i.e., parameters, faigi;frigi;fcigi; and b. Because global optimization dominates
sequential optimization, PoA is always greater than or equal to one.
3. Space Allocations in Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the Nash equilibrium wholesale prices and space allocation, i.e., the
pure strategy (we
1;:::;we
n) from which no supplier has incentive to unilaterally deviate. We study
the sensitivity of the results to the model parameters, and quantify supply chain e±ciency.
3.1. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We ¯rst show that there exists a unique equilibrium to the decentralized game.
Theorem 1. The game with n players has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (we
1;:::;we
n),







In particular, with two suppliers, the unique Nash equilibrium (we
1;we














Thus, the percentage of the total margin captured by supplier i, (ri¡wi)=(ri¡ci), should be set
equal to a function of the space, bsj=(1¡bsi). As a result, the best response function of supplier i,
wb:r:
i (wj), is increasing in wj.
A side result of the theorem is that the shelf space allocation tends to be more even in the
decentralized channel than in the integrated channel.
Proposition 1. s¤
i ¸s¤
j if and only if se
i ¸se
























Therefore, suppliers' competition distorts the value of the wholesale prices, relative to the value
of the unit production costs, resulting in a suboptimal shelf space allocation. Speci¯cally, the least
attractive products are given too much space, to the detriment of the most attractive products.
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3.2. Sensitivity Analysis
We next investigate how wholesale prices, shelf space allocations, and pro¯ts for the suppliers, the
retailer, and the whole supply chain vary when the problem parameters change.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium wholesale prices, allocated space and pro¯ts are such that
(a) we
i is increasing with ci;ri and ai;
(b) we
j, j 6=i, is increasing with ci and decreasing with ri and ai;
(c) se
i is decreasing with ci and increasing with ri and ai;
(d) se
j, j 6=i, is increasing with ci and decreasing with ri and ai;
(e) ¦e
Si is decreasing with ci and increasing with ri and ai;
(f) ¦e
Sj, j 6=i, is increasing with ci and decreasing with ri and ai;
(g) ¦e
R is decreasing with ci and increasing with ri and ai;
(h) and ¦e
SC is quasi-convex (increasing or decreasing) in ci, ri and ai.
Wholesale prices always increase with costs. The supplier who su®ers from the cost increase
therefore obtains smaller space allocation and lower pro¯ts. In contrast, the competing suppliers
take advantage of their dominant position by obtaining larger shelf space while charging higher
wholesale prices. As a result, the retailer's pro¯t decreases with the suppliers' costs. It is therefore
in the retailer's interest to participate to cost-reduction programs at its suppliers (e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. has invested a lot of e®orts to cut packaging waste at its suppliers, see Kabel 2007),
because it leads to a reduction in wholesale prices, not only from the suppliers involved in the
program, but also from their competitors.
Also, the suppliers' wholesale prices, allocated spaces, and pro¯ts increase with the ¯nal price of
their products ri and decrease with the prices of their competitors' products rj, j 6=i. On the other
hand, the retailer's pro¯t always increases after a retail price rise. Similarly, when the market size
of a given supplier ai increases, its wholesale price, allocated space and pro¯ts increase, while they
decrease for the competing suppliers, and the retailer's pro¯t increases. Thus, suppliers' marketing
e®orts for increasing the brand awareness of their products, allowing them to increase the retail
prices of their products or to expand the size of their market, not only bene¯t them, as well as
the retailer, but also harm their competitors. Despite the decreasing marginal returns of space on
demand, competition for shelf space can almost be seen as a zero-sum game, where any gain by
one supplier is counterbalanced by a loss by the other suppliers.
Interestingly, the retailer also bene¯ts from strengthened brand names. Therefore, supply chain-
wide e®orts can be devoted to increasing the strength of a brand, as all parties may gain from theMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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resulting increase in revenue. In particular, retailers have become extremely powerful at helping
build strong brand names (mindspace) with their advertising, promotions, and displays (shelfs-
pace). As proposed by Corstjens and Corstjens (1995), \Shelfspace and mindspace are linked and
complementary. If a product has achieved considerable mindspace{if it is present and liked in
many consumer minds{this in itself will be a powerful incentive for the distribution to stock it. On
the other hand, shelfspace is a powerful generator of mindspace. Seeing a product regularly helps
increase its presence in the consumer's mind, and improves its image by suggesting it is popular."
From (h), the supply chain pro¯t is quasi-convex in the cost, selling price, and market size.
Hence, a cost increase may create a positive externality on the supply chain, when the cost is large.
Intuitively, the supply chain pro¯ts improve when the supplier who experiences the cost increase is
also the most expensive. From Proposition 1, this supplier receives a larger space allocation than
what would have be optimal for the integrated supply chain. This above-optimal shelf space share
exerts pressure puts the other suppliers under pressure, and results in an increase in the supply
chain total pro¯t. Alternatively, a cost reduction program may not always be bene¯cial to the
entire supply chain. Similarly to the e®ects of changes in costs, an increase in the selling price ri
or the market size ai may induce a negative externality on the supply chain pro¯ts.
Finally, for completeness, we investigate the impact of the sales elasticity with respect to shelf
space, that is, b, on the wholesale prices, shelf space allocation, and pro¯ts. In contrast to the
changes in unit production costs, selling prices and market sizes, changes in elasticity lead to
non-monotonic e®ects. Speci¯cally, wholesale prices are non-monotonic functions of the sales space
elasticity, leading to non-monotonic behavior of the pro¯t functions. Figure 1 illustrates the non-
monotonic behavior of wholesale prices and pro¯ts as a function of elasticity b.
The next proposition characterizes how the shelf space allocation changes with b. When demand
becomes more sensitive to the number of displays, the most attractive products (from the retailer's
standpoint) receive more facings, to the detriment of the least attractive products.
Proposition 3. Without loss of generality, assume that s¤
1 ¸ ::: ¸ s¤
n. Then, there exists k 2









For n = 2, Proposition 3 implies that the supplier with the larger s¤
i captures more shelf space as
b increases, to the expense of the supplier with the lower s¤
i.
3.3. Supply Chain E±ciency
In this section, we characterize the loss of e±ciency resulting from decentralizing the decision
making in the supply chain. We ¯rst analyze the basic model introduced in x2 and then considerMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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Figure 1 Comparative statics with changes in elasticity




















































what happens when the retailer can make pricing decisions as well (x3.4), and when the retailer
pursues di®erent objectives than pro¯t maximization (x3.5). We use PoA to measure supply chain
e±ciency, de¯ned as the maximum ratio (10) over all problem instances.























Corollary 1. The Price of Anarchy is increasing in n, i.e., PoAn+1 ¸PoAn.
Corollary 1 follows from (14), where, for the case of n+1 suppliers, we set sn+1 =0. As a result
the PoA with n+1 suppliers must be greater than or equal to that with n. Given that PoAn is
increasing in n, we can solve the optimization problem for n=2 and n=1, to provide bounds.
In addition, Lemma 1 in appendix demonstrates that, for any given n, the n-variable optimization
problem in the right-hand side of (14) can be simpli¯ed into a two-variable optimization problem.
Therefore, the PoA can be computed numerically, by solving a two-variable optimization problem.Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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The next two propositions show that that the PoA is relatively low and insensitive to the number
of suppliers.
Proposition 4. The Price of Anarchy for n=2 is PoA2 2[1:051;1:052].
Proposition 5. The Price of Anarchy for n=1 is PoA1 2[1:055;1:056].
A loss of e±ciency of 5-6% might seem low, especially when compared to the PoA bounds derived
in supply games with stochastic demand (i.e., 4/3 in supply games with option contracts, see
Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Simchi-Levi 2003; and e¡1 with wholesale-price contracts, see Perakis
and Roels 2007). This small level of ine±ciency can be explained by the presence of an alternative
use of capacity. In traditional supply games, unused capacity is lost, and the reservation pro¯t
of the follower in those games is often set to zero (with the exception of Lariviere and Porteus
2001 and Bernstein and Marx 2006). In contrast, in the shelf-space allocation game, all capacity
is utilized, softening the impact of suboptimal decisions. Nevertheless, pro¯t margins are thin in
retail, and a 5% increase in e±ciency can make a real impact on the bottom line.
3.4. When the Retailer Takes Pricing Decisions
We now investigate the impact of letting the retailer choose the selling prices to the end-consumers.
Somewhat surprisingly, supply chain e±ciency decreases, despite the fact that the retailer has now
more levers to coordinate the channel. In fact, the retailer can make sub-optimal decisions (from
a supply chain standpoint) not only in shelf space allocation, but also in pricing.
For this purpose we consider a variant of Mart¶ ³n-Herr¶ an et al. (2006), where the customer demand
for i is equal to air
¡¹
i sb
i, with ¹¸1. The demand for product i is thus a decreasing convex function
of the retail prices ri, and all products share the same price elasticity ¹. A price increase of product
i has no direct e®ect on the demand of other products, but indirectly in°uences the shelf space
allocation.
If the supply chain were integrated, the optimal pricing scheme is ri(ci) = ¹ci=(¹ ¡ 1) (with a
slight abuse of notation, by de¯ning ri(:) as a function). In a decentralized channel however, prices
are set equal to ri(wi)=¹wi=(¹¡1) and are therefore larger. The retailer's optimal space allocation
follows (3) with mi =ai(ri(wi)¡wi)(ri(wi))
¡¹ =(¹¡1)¹¡1=¹¹aiw
¡(¹¡1)
i . The shelf space allocated
to product i is therefore decreasing with wi, similarly to the basic model introduced in x2. We
derive an equilibrium result, analogous to Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. When the retailer sets the prices ri in addition to allocating the space si, then theMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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game with n players has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (w1;:::;wn), characterized by the







The next Proposition quanti¯es the PoA when pricing decisions are endogenous and strikingly
contrasts with Propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 6. When the retailer sets prices optimally, PoA=e=2, where e is the exponential
number, i.e., e=2:7182:::.
Consequently, the decentralized supply chain may be very ine±cient when pricing decisions are
endogenous. Intuitively, the supply chain is ine±cient because of double marginalization (Spen-
gler 1950), not because of competition for shelf space. In fact, the worst-case problem instance
characterizing the PoA bound, used in the proof of Proposition 6, is independent of the space
allocation.
The bound e=2 is remarkably close to the bounds derived previously, in other double-
marginalization games: 4/3 with option contracts (Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Simchi-Levi 2003),
and e¡1 with wholesale-price contracts (Perakis and Roels 2007). Based on this observation, we
conjecture that double marginalization can generate about 25-40% ine±ciencies in the presence
of decreasing marginal returns (either through a concave demand-price relationship or through a
demand probability distribution). Larger bounds can obviously be derived when marginal returns
are nondecreasing, such as Cournot-based competition models.
Comparing Proposition 6 with Propositions 4 and 5 also reveals that the ine±ciencies arising from
shelf space competition much smaller than those arising from double marginalization. Nevertheless,
shelf space competition generates ine±ciencies on its own, and is a signi¯cant issue given the thin
margins in retail.
3.5. Other Space Allocation Rules
So far, we have assumed that the retailer allocated her limited shelf space to maximize her gross
pro¯ts. In particular, the optimal shelf space allocation was assumed to be based on the gross pro¯t
margin contribution mi =ai(ri ¡wi) of each supplier.
Many commercial software programs are however based on di®erent allocation rules, such as
sales, sales per square foot, gross pro¯t margin per square foot, or stocking expense (see Curhan
1973 and Corstjens and Doyle 1983 for a review). These alternate objectives are not necessarilyMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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irrational or suboptimal, because many practical issues (e.g., generating store tra±c) are ignored in
our idealized model. It is therefore critical to understand whether supply chain e±ciency improves
or deteriorates under these alternate objectives.
Allocation based on gross pro¯t margin per square foot. When the retailer allocates the shelf space
proportionally to the products' pro¯t margins per square foot, supply chain e±ciency decreases.






Anticipating this allocation rule, the suppliers will set their wholesale prices to maximize their
pro¯ts. The next proposition characterizes the Price of Anarchy in this case.
Proposition 7. When the retailer bases the shelf-space allocation on gross pro¯t margin per
square foot instead of gross pro¯t margin, the Price of Anarchy is larger.
Therefore, by committing to a suboptimal allocation rule, the retailer worsens the e±ciency of
the channel. As a matter of fact, we ¯nd that PoA
$=sqft
2 2[1:298;1:299].
Allocation based on sales. When the retailer allocates the shelf space proportionally to sales or
revenue, possibly divided by the square footage, the allocation decision is independent from the
wholesale prices. In this case, the supplier pro¯t functions are increasing with their respective
wholesale prices, and it is optimal for them to charge the highest possible wholesale price, i.e.,
wi = ri for all i. As a result, the retailer's pro¯t is equal to zero. Supply chain e±ciency might
however increase, depending on the value of the parameters.
4. Retailing Practices: Towards a More E±cient Supply Chain?
In this section, we analyze di®erent retailing practices and discuss their impact on the shelf allo-
cation game. In particular, we are interested in whether they help improve supply chain e±ciency.
We ¯rst discuss the potential of pay-to-stay fees, a rent that retailers charge manufacturers for
space. We show that these contracts can coordinate the channel. Second, we analyze the impact
of horizontal integration (i.e., when a manufacturer owns several brands) and vertical integration
(e.g., when a retailer sells private-label brands). Vertical integration can also be viewed as the
widespread|and controversial|practice of category management, according to which the retailer
delegates the management of the category to one of the suppliers, called the category captain.Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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4.1. Pay-to-Stay Fees
Suppliers often pay fees to ensure the continued presence of their product on the shelf for some
period (commonly one year). These fees are usually called pay-to-stay fees. We show that pay-
to-stay fee contracts always increase the retailer's pro¯t, in comparison to a situation where only
wholesale prices are contractible. Interestingly, these fees are never pro¯table to the suppliers.
Thus, we assume that the shelf space is contractible, and that it is sold through an auction. At
equilibrium, all suppliers pay the same amount per unit of shelf space, denoted by f, and the sum
of requested shelf spaces equals the total shelf capacity. The retailer's pro¯t is then equal to the













where superscript PTS refers to \pay-to-stay" fees. Here, sPTS
i is determined by the suppliers,
that pay for each unit of space a price f. In contrast to the model introduced in x2, the retailer
does not make any decision here since both the pay-to-stay fee and the shelf space allocation are
negotiated among the suppliers.
The suppliers' revenue is the pro¯t from sales less the pay-to-stay fee. For a given fee f, all
suppliers need to decide their wholesale prices and the amount of shelf space capacity they want
to be allocated. The equilibrium fee f then balances supply with demand: if supplier i requests
sPTS
i units of capacity, the equilibrium fee f is such that
Pn
i=1sPTS
i =1. Plugging this equilibrium
condition into the suppliers' pro¯t functions leads to the following game:
max
wi;si
¦Si(wi;si) = (wi ¡ci)ais
b
i ¡fsi; 8i:
The ¯rst-order optimality conditions for each supplier i, which are necessary and su±cient










i ai ¡f =0:
It is thus optimal to set wPTS
i = ri, and to allocate the shelf space capacity so that f = ai(ri ¡
ci)b(sPTS
i )
b¡1 for all i. The latter condition implies that sPTS
i =s¤
i for all i; consequently, the shelf
space allocation with pay-to-stay fees is supply-chain optimal, and because the total supply chain
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The next proposition compares the pro¯ts with and without pay-to-stay fees. While the supply
chain is globally e±cient in the presence of these fees, no supplier earns additional pro¯ts. Because
only the retailer bene¯ts from this contractual arrangement, it is likely that the initiative of impos-
ing pay-to-stay fees and transferring all the pro¯t margin from sales to the suppliers will originate
from the retailer in practice.
Proposition 8. By switching from wholesale-price contracts to pay-to-stay fees, (a) all the
suppliers earn lower pro¯ts, and (b) the retailer earns higher pro¯ts.
With pay-to-stay fees, the retailer's total pro¯t comes from the fees, and not from the sales
revenue. Therefore, under this contract, the retailer is only rewarded for her core capability of
warehousing and shelf-space leaser. Brown and Tucker (1961) and Cairns (1962) already suggested
that suppliers should pay retailers for their desired shelf space, and that these payments should
exceed the retailers' opportunity costs for using such space. Interestingly, Cairns (1962) proposed
that the price o®ered by a supplier for a unit of shelf space should be equal to the product of the
retailer's unit pro¯t margin with the ratio of sales to space. In comparison, our model suggests
that the price f should be equal to the supply chain's unit pro¯t margin ri ¡ci, multiplied by the
ratio of sales to space, ai(s¤
i)
b¡1, and weighted by the sales-space elasticity b. Hence, our model is
consistent with Cairns' argument, but re¯nes his proposal by considering the entire supply chain's,
instead of the retailer's, pro¯t margin.
In practice, however, retailers are more than shelf-space leasers, because of their ability to in°u-
ence the sales of particular product (e.g., through advertising) and they should be rewarded for
this function as well. In fact, retailers have recently become more powerful, by exploiting the value
of their contact with the consumer and realizing the importance of the marketing variables (price,
display, promotion) under their control. Shelf-space lease is certainly an important operational
lever for retailers, but it needs to be aligned with their strategy for in°uencing consumer choice
and gaining mindspace (Corstjens and Corstjens 1995).
4.2. Integrating the Supply Chain
Horizontal Integration. If suppliers are horizontally integrated, i.e., one supplier owns all the
products in the shelf, full e±ciency can be achieved as follows. The supplier, acting as a leader,
sets the wholesale prices equal to the retail prices. Because she earns zero margin, the retailer is
indi®erent about the shelf space allocation and can be encouraged to choose the allocation that
maximizes the supply chain total pro¯ts (possibly by being o®ered wholesale prices slightly belowMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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the retail prices). Therefore, the incentive misalignment disappears as soon as the suppliers are
horizontally integrated.
This result sheds light on the brand strategy of large consumer good producers such as Procter &
Gamble or Unilever: even if the products are competing for the same shelf space, and are somehow
cannibalizing the sales of each other, they give the consumer-good producer enough power to
control the shelf-space allocation and capture at the same time signi¯cant pro¯t margins.
Vertical Integration. We now analyze a model of vertical integration, where the retailer is verti-
cally integrated with one of the suppliers. This model has two di®erent interpretations.
There is vertical integration when a retailer owns one of the brands, i.e., when one of the
products is a private-label brand. The e®ects of vertical integration are becoming more important
as brands introduced by retailers (such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Target Corporation) knock
many second-tier brands o® the shelves, reducing the product category to a few brands next to
their own private-label brands (Jubak 2005).
This model of vertical integration is also representative of category management. Category man-
agement is a marketing initiative that recommends centrally managing the entire product category
instead of managing each brand in a decentralized fashion. Ideally, category management should
be adopted by all supply chain partners, i.e., both the retailers and suppliers, to make globally
optimal decisions and obtain superior pro¯ts. In practice however, the retailer appoints one of
her suppliers, called the \category captain," to manage the entire product category on her behalf.
Indeed, suppliers have typically more information than the retailers about product costs, planned
promotions and new product introductions, as well as the end-consumer demand (since they have
an aggregated view of the market). However, as we shall see, the category captain is also biased
towards increasing the sales of his own product, and will be tempted to push his product to the
detriment of the other suppliers' products.
Let us assume that supplier 1 is the category captain. To keep the analysis general, we do not
model the speci¯c terms of agreement between the retailer and the category captain. Indeed, mutual
trust is generally considered as a prerequisite to the success of category management, see Steiner
(2001). Instead, we consider the retailer and the category captain as being integrated into a single
¯rm. Using the same game as in the decentralized setting, we assume that suppliers i, i=2;:::;n,
¯rst decide their wholesale prices wCM
i (where superscript CM refers to category management),
and then the retailer and supplier 1 jointly decide the shelf space allocation. Formally, we let
wCM
1 = c1. The retailer's problem is therefore to choose the shelf space allocation sCM
1 ;:::;sCM
nMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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i. Similar to the games analyzed
before, it is optimal to allocate space following Equation (3).
The next proposition analyzes the changes in supplier i's wholesale price and pro¯t, i=2;:::;n,
as well as the total supply chain pro¯t, with category management.















Therefore, vertical integration always hurts the suppliers who are not the category captain, even
though they still act as Stackelberg leaders. In particular, suppliers excluded from the coalition
are allocated less shelf space despite their lower wholesale prices. Using a di®erent model, in which
demand is insensitive to shelf space and the retailer chooses the selling prices, Kurtulu» s and Toktay
(2005) also ¯nd that category management is bene¯cial to the retailer and the category captain,
and harmful to the excluded suppliers. Our model therefore corroborates their conclusions when
retail prices are ¯xed.
In fact, the collusion might be so harmful to the excluded suppliers that the total supply chain
e±ciency might even decrease. The next proposition computes the Price of Anarchy of a vertically
integrated supply chain, and shows that it is larger than the PoA of a completely decentralized
channel (Proposition 4).
Proposition 10. With category management and n=2, PoACM
2 2[1:079;1:080].
In fact, the Price of Anarchy is maximized when m¤
1 =m¤
2, i.e., a1(r1 ¡c1)=a2(r2 ¡c2). At this
point, not only s¤
1 =s¤
2, but also se
1 =se
2 in the basic model (from Proposition 1). Hence, the same
shelf space allocation can achieve full e±ciency of a completely decentralized supply chain, while
at the same time be associated with the worst e±ciency of a vertically integrated chain under
category management. Moreover, vertical integration is the least e®ective at improving channel
e±ciency when the two products have comparable pro¯t rates.
The worst-case performance of vertical integration, relative to that of a decentralized supply
chain, sheds light on one of the main pitfalls of category management. The goal of category man-
agement is to improve channel e±ciency, by centrally managing the product category, so that each
partner is better o®. In reality, category management raises antitrust concerns because it leads toMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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noncompetitive coalitions, favoring one supplier over another (Steiner 2001, Bush and Gelb 2005).
Our model of vertical integration shows that if one of the partners is left aside from the coalition,
her margins and sales will plummet, as well as her pro¯t, while channel e±ciency might be even
worse than without category management. As an illustration, a manager reported in a Federal
Trade Commission workshop panel that \the competitor was able to reduce my shelf space to I call
it unlivable living conditions and unlivable space" (FTC Report 2001). Consequently, the antitrust
concerns about category management are well grounded, especially given that the practice worsens
the overall supply chain e±ciency (without mentioning the detrimental impact it might have on
the end-consumer through higher prices and reduced variety).
5. Conclusions
This paper introduces a model of supply chain competition for shelf space. Our model builds
on the shelf space allocation model by Corstjens and Doyle (1983) to analyze the competitive
pressure on suppliers to obtain shelf space. When the retailer allocates her shelf space so as to
maximize her pro¯t (or the gross margin per square foot), suppliers can increase their space share
by reducing their wholesale prices. We show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in the
wholesale pricing game between suppliers. The equilibrium prices of all suppliers are increasing
with any supplier's cost; they are increasing on the corresponding selling price, but decreasing on
a competitor's selling price.
We also characterize the loss of e±ciency in the decentralized supply chain, using the Price
of Anarchy. In particular, we demonstrate that the ine±ciencies created in the space allocation
process are minimal, less than 6%, with wholesale price contracts, and that full coordination is
achieved with pay-to-stay fee contracts. On the other hand, coordination of retail prices is very
necessary, as double marginalization may lead to a 30% loss of e±ciency.
Finally, we examine the impact of some retailing practices on the space allocation decision, with
a particular attention to category management. Speci¯cally, we show that category management
bene¯ts the retailer and the category captain, and hurts the other suppliers, even when pricing
decisions are exogenous, formalizing and quantifying the antitrust concerns against the practice.
The current model can be extended in several directions. First, one could consider the assortment
size to be endogenous. In the current model, supply chain pro¯ts always improve as n increases.
However, restricting the number of SKUs intensi¯es competition between suppliers, potentially
leading to larger retailer's pro¯ts. Thus, if the assortment decision is made by the retailer, the
optimal assortment size will result from the trade-o® between the increase in supply chain pro¯tMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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(the size of the pie) and the pressure put on the suppliers (the share for the retailer). Another
promising extension would be to model inventory decisions with stochastic demand. Conceivably,
the performance of supply contracts (e.g., wholesale-price, buyback, quantity discount) is signi¯-
cantly a®ected by competition for shelf space, and it would be interesting to assess how the previous
conclusions about their coordination potential (see Cachon 2003) carry over in a multiple product
environment.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1









































is decreasing with wi, and thus ¦Si is quasi-concave in wi. The best-response function













Because each supplier's pro¯t function is continuous quasi-concave in wi, and that the strategy space is the
compact convex interval [c1;r1]£:::£[cn;rn], there exists a Nash equilibrium.
























































Suppose that there are two equilibria w
eq1 and w

















all the inequalities are in fact equalities and hence w
eq1 =w
eq2.Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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Proof of Proposition 1



























































Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The results are shown using the implicit function theorem and the chain rule. For this purpose, we
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so it also increases with m
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where the inequality follows from discarding the partial derivatives of µk with respect to s
e










, which are positive by (A-7).







and hence the term















































































k ·0, which, together with the fact that the cubic coe±cient of s
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is increasing and ¦
e
SC is quasi-convex in m
¤
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In fact, ¦
e
SC may be increasing or decreasing in m
¤



























SC is increasing in m
¤
i. Suppose on the other hand that m
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i =ai(ri ¡ci) and mi =ai(ri ¡wi), we have the following:
(a) Equation (A-6) implies that w
e








Equation (A-7) imply that w
e
i is increasing with ri and ai.
(b) Equation (A-6) implies that for j 6=i, w
e
j is increasing with ci and decreasing with ri and ai.
(c) Equation (A-7) implies that s
e
i is decreasing with ci and increasing with ri and ai.
(d) Equation (A-7) implies that, for j 6=i, s
e
j is increasing with ci and decreasing with ri and ai.
(e) Equation (A-9) implies that ¦
e
Si is decreasing with ci and increasing with ri and ai.
(f) Equation (A-10) implies that, for j 6=i, ¦
e
Sj is increasing with ci and decreasing with ri and ai.
(g) Equation (A-11) implies that ¦
e
R is decreasing with ci and increasing with ri and ai.
(h) Since ¦
e
SC is quasi-convex in m
¤
i, it is quasi-convex in ci, ri and ai.
Proof of Proposition 3
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¸0. Thus, as we increase b, the items with highest s
e
i gain
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Proof of Theorem 2










, and mi =Ks
1¡b
i , where K is the same for all i. Equation (10) yields that the








































Lemma 1. The Price of Anarchy is given by s2 =:::=sn =
z
n¡1





















































































where A corresponds to the term in brackets in the numerator of the objective function of (14) and B
corresponds to the term in the denominator.

























Suppose (s1;:::;sn) satis¯es the ¯rst-order optimality conditions. Hence any si and sj, j 6=i, satisfy
[f(sn)¡f(sj)]g(si)¡[g(sn)¡g(sj)]+g(sn)f(sj)¡f(sn)g(sj)=0:
Fix sj and sn, and denote by F(si) the left-hand side of the above equation. It is easy to see that F(si) has
only one stationary point. Hence, it has at most two roots. In fact, it has exactly two roots, namely sj and
sn. As a result, every optimal solution (s1;:::;sn), in the interior of the domain, has k components equal to sMart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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and (n¡k) components equal to (1¡ks)=(n¡k), for some feasible s. Without loss of generality, we assume
that s¸(1¡ks)=(n¡k), i.e., s¸1=n.







































When s¸1=n, the term (b+(1¡b)=(1¡(1¡ks=(n¡k)))) is decreasing in k, as well as the multiplicative
coe±cient (1¡ks). Thus, PoAn is maximized when k = 1, i.e., when s2 = ::: = sn: Substituting s by 1¡z
leads to the lemma statement. From this formulation, it is easy to see that PoAn is in fact strictly increasing
with n, con¯rming a posteriori that a non-interior solution, (s1;:::;sn) with si = 0 for some i, will never be
optimal.
Proof of Theorem 3









































which is equivalent to Equation (15).
One can restrict the strategy space to a compact space, which, together with the quasiconcavity of the






for j 6=i. An argument similar to the one of Theorem 1 yields uniqueness.
Proof of Proposition 6




















. From Equation (3),
mi = Ks
1¡b









, where K is the same for all i. Furthermore, from Equation
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The Price of Anarchy is the maximum ratio ¦
¤
SC=¦SC over all problem instances, i.e., over all feasible b, ¹,





























x =e, where e is the exponential

















Here, the maximum can be shown to be reached for b = 0, and hence yields PoA = e=2. Note that this
bound is independent of n.
Proof of Proposition 7
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i=1si =1, s1;:::;sn ¸0, and 0·b·1.
We can easily show that the Price of Anarchy is reached with s1 =:::=sn¡1 =
z
n¡1
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2 is reached (maximized) with b=1, and we ¯nd numerically that PoA
$=sqft
2 2[1:298;1:299].
Proof of Proposition 8
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·1 for any s
e
i and b between 0 and 1, thereby




i for all i. Because the pro¯ts of all suppliers decrease,





Proof of Proposition 9
Since w
CM
1 =c1 and w
b:r





































































Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Let, without loss of generality, m
¤










































































































over all problem instances. Expressing m
¤
2 as a function of s
CM
2 simpli¯es the problem to a two-variable
optimization problem. Solving the resulting maximization problem over all feasible values of s2 and b (between
0 and 1) yields that PoA
CM
2 2[1:079;1:080].Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz and Roels: Competing for Shelf Space
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